Millions of payments happen every day across the U.S. and serve as the backbone of its economic activity. Washington and the Federal Reserve have spent the past few years building new rails for those payments — instant settlement, digital federal disbursements, a regulatory framework for stablecoins. Yet the success of that infrastructure ultimately depends on a much smaller decision, made at the checkout counter: which payment method a consumer actually uses.
This study examines that decision from the demand side. Using the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s pooled Survey and Diary of Consumer Payment Choice for 2021–2024, it asks two questions. Do consumers’ own ratings of cash, credit and debit predict which one they use for an in-person purchase? And when people pay with something other than the method they say they prefer, what is that deviation associated with — the relative convenience of their preferred method, the size of the purchase, or the kind of merchant?
Key findings
Convenience is the attribute most closely tied to how Americans pay.
- +0.63 pphigher probability of using a payment method for each one-point increase in its Convenience rating, after controls — the largest of the five rated attributes.
- −4.7 to −4.9 pplower probability of deviating from the preferred method for each one-point higher Convenience Advantage, for cash, credit and debit preferrers alike.
- +9.1 / −8.6 ppLarger purchases push cash preferrers toward deviation (+9.1 pp per log unit) but credit and debit preferrers toward persistence (−8.6 and −4.5 pp).
Interpretation matters. These are model-specific marginal effects from pooled cross-sectional survey data. They describe associations, not causal effects, and are measured in percentage points of probability — not percentages of a share.
Why U.S. payment choice matters
Recent modernization efforts have been put in place to benefit a number of American stakeholders, including the government, businesses and consumers. In 2025 an executive order began moving federal payments away from paper checks toward electronic methods. The GENIUS Act, signed in July 2025, established the first federal regulatory framework for payment stablecoins, and the House-passed CLARITY Act proposed a broader framework for digital asset markets. The Federal Reserve’s FedNow service, launched in 2023, offers an instant payment rail that operates 24/7 for eligible depository institutions.
All of these developments create a supply-side infrastructure that aims to enable Americans to use digital-based methods for safer, cheaper and faster payments. But the U.S. has historically lagged in modernizing its payment system and in adopting new payment technology. Canada and Sweden have pursued substantial modernization programs; Sweden now has an almost entirely digital payments market.
The infrastructure is being built. The open question is whether consumers will change how they pay.
Prior research points to why the question is hard. Catalini and Lilley (2021) attribute the U.S. lag to legacy infrastructure, market fragmentation and limited competition. Han and Wang argue that early, successful adoption of card payments left Americans with little incremental benefit from switching, producing a mostly card-complementing wave of new technology with sluggish growth. In that reading, modernization faces a demand-side challenge of “sticky” habits: consumers continue to use familiar instruments even when new rails are waiting for them.
That is why it is crucial for policymakers and businesses to understand what shapes payment choice from the consumer’s side — and what forces already exist that lead consumers to depart from the method they prefer. Most existing work studies these two questions separately: one literature models which instrument consumers adopt and use, another studies merchant and transaction context. This thesis connects them in a single two-stage design, and it separates card users into credit-preferring and debit-preferring consumers rather than treating “cards” as one group.
What people say versus what they use
The pooled sample shows a payment mix that is steadily moving toward cards. Among in-person cash, credit and debit transactions, cash use fell from 30.7% in 2021 to 24.3% in 2024. Credit card use increased from 36.5% to 42.5%, while debit stayed roughly flat, moving from 32.9% to 33.2%.
Payment method use for in-person transactions, 2021–2024
Adapted from the original paper
Source: thesis Figure 2 (pooled SCPC/DCPC, 2021–2024). Share of in-person cash, credit and debit transactions in the analytic sample.
Stated preferences tell a related but different story. Asked which method they prefer for in-person purchases, credit and debit dominate throughout the period. Credit preference rose from 41.0% of respondents in 2021 to 44.8% in 2024, while debit preference eased from 43.3% to 40.4%. Cash preferrers remained a stable minority of roughly 15%–17%.
Two measurement details matter when reading the charts side by side. Figure 2 is a share of transactions; Figure 4 is a share of respondents. A consumer who prefers debit may still make many cash purchases in a given diary period, and a small group of frequent payers can move the transaction mix without changing the preference mix.
Stated preferred in-person payment method, 2021–2024
Adapted from the original paper
Source: thesis Figure 4 (SCPC). Share of respondents naming each method as their preferred in-person instrument.
The gap between the two becomes visible when each transaction is matched with its payer’s stated preference. The matrix below does exactly that. Reading along each row, preference-consistent use — the diagonal — ranges from 62.4% for cash preferrers to 75.1% for credit preferrers. In other words, roughly a quarter or more of each group’s in-person transactions are made with a method other than the one they say they prefer.
What people say they prefer versus what they actually use
Adapted from the original paper
Deviation rate: cash preferrers 37.6% · credit preferrers 24.9% · debit preferrers 33.4%
Source: thesis Table 5. Rows are the stated preferred method; each row sums to 100% (subject to rounding) of that group's in-person transactions. Diagonal cells are preference-consistent transactions.
The off-diagonal cells show direction. Cash preferrers who deviate lean toward debit (23.1%) more than credit (14.6%). Credit preferrers who deviate mostly use cash (18.9%) rather than debit (6.0%), and debit preferrers who deviate also lean toward cash (23.5%) rather than credit (9.9%). Card preferrers, in short, rarely swap one card for the other; when they break from their preference, they usually reach for cash.
How the study measures choice
The data come from the Survey of Consumer Payment Choice (SCPC) and the Diary of Consumer Payment Choice (DCPC), published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and fielded through USC’s Understanding America Study. Bank and merchant transaction data are usually proprietary, so these surveys are the standard public resource for studying U.S. consumer payments. Respondents are recruited through probability-based sampling. The SCPC records who they are and how they rate each payment method; the DCPC records the transactions the same people make over a three-day diary.
Linking the two by respondent ID makes it possible to compare what consumers say about payment methods with what they actually do. The study pools 2021 through 2024 and restricts the sample to in-person cash, credit and debit transactions — the three instruments most widely used at the point of sale.
The transactions are spread across the four years: 10,055 in 2021, 11,805 in 2022, 13,019 in 2023 and 15,828 in 2024. For the choice model, each transaction is expanded into three rows — one for cash, one for credit and one for debit — giving 152,121 alternative-level observations before model-specific exclusions.
What respondents rate
Before recording their transactions, respondents rate each payment method on five attributes, each on a scale from 1 to 5: Acceptance (how likely it is to be accepted), Cost (the cost of owning and using it, coded so that 5 means inexpensive), Convenience (ease of use and frictionlessness), Security (protection against loss of information and money) and Speed (time spent at the counter). They also name a single preferred in-person method.
1Stage 1: which method gets chosen
The first stage uses a conditional logit, the discrete-choice model introduced by McFadden (1974) and grounded in random utility theory. For every transaction, the consumer faces three alternatives, and the model asks whether the alternative they rated higher on a given attribute is more likely to be the one they used. A baseline version includes only the five ratings; the main version adds controls that interact transaction size with the credit and debit alternatives and credit card rewards with the credit alternative. Results are reported as marginal effects on the probability of choosing a method.
2Stage 2: when preferences hold
The second stage uses probit regressions of deviation — a transaction paid with anything other than the stated preferred method. Its central variable is a new measure, the Convenience Advantage: the convenience rating of the preferred method minus the average convenience rating of the two alternatives. A cash preferrer who rates cash 5 and both cards 2 has a Convenience Advantage of 3. The models also include log transaction size, merchant group, demographics (age, gender, race, education and a high-income indicator) and year fixed effects, estimated separately for cash, credit and debit preferrers and then for specific directions of deviation.
Standard errors throughout are cluster-robust, clustered at the respondent level, reflecting the fact that the same person contributes many transactions.
The five attributes
The first stage finds that payment choice is systematically associated with consumers’ subjective evaluations. All five attribute ratings are positive and statistically significant predictors of use, in both the baseline and the controlled models. The magnitudes, however, differ sharply.
Stage 1: marginal effect of a one-point higher attribute rating on the probability of using that method
Source: thesis Table 4 (conditional logit with interaction controls, N = 63,046) and Table 3 (baseline, N = 70,659). Percentage points; cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. All estimates significant at p<0.01. Associations, not causal effects.
Convenience leads. In the model with controls (Table 4), a one-unit increase in a method’s Convenience rating is associated with a 0.63-percentage-point increase in the probability of choosing that method (marginal effect 0.00629). In the baseline model the figure is about 0.71 points. For a consumer who rated cash’s convenience 3 out of 5, a one-point increase to 4 would be associated with roughly that much higher probability of paying with cash.
Cost is the only attribute that strengthens. Adding controls attenuates most estimates, but the Cost marginal effect rises from 0.231 to 0.507 percentage points — the second largest in the controlled model. Speed is essentially unchanged at 0.260 points. Acceptance falls to 0.117 points and Security to 0.113 points, the smallest of the five.
Consumers appear to put greater weight on the user-friendliness of payment methods, while perceiving security as standard.
That ordering — convenience at the top, security at the bottom — is consistent with Koulayev et al. (2016), and with Schuh and Stavins’s (2015) finding that speed and security matter differently for different decisions. It does not mean security is unimportant; it may simply be taken for granted across all three instruments, leaving little variation for consumers to act on.
The controls are informative too
Relative to cash, a one-unit larger log transaction amount is associated with a 0.248-percentage-point higher probability of choosing credit and a 0.146-point higher probability of choosing debit. The credit-specific rewards interaction is associated with a 0.547-point higher probability of using credit — the largest effect among the controls.
Two cautions apply. First, these are marginal effects on a probability, from a specific model with a specific set of controls; they are not method-independent “weights” that consumers place on attributes. Second, the ratings are recorded before the diary, but they may partly reflect habit: someone who pays with cash every day may rate cash highly because they use it, not the other way around.
When preferences hold or break
If ratings predict choice, what explains the quarter or more of transactions that depart from a consumer’s stated preference? The descriptive picture from the matrix is clear: persistence is highest among credit preferrers at 75.1%, followed by debit preferrers at 66.6% and cash preferrers at 62.4%. The corresponding deviation rates are 24.9%, 33.4% and 37.6%.
Convenience offers a first clue. Credit preferrers rate their preferred method as the most convenient relative to the alternatives, with a mean Convenience Advantage of 0.836. Debit preferrers follow at 0.497, while cash preferrers average only 0.041 — suggesting that those who prefer cash may not strongly believe in its relative convenience.
Stage 2: change in the probability of deviating from the preferred method
One-point higher Convenience Advantage
One-unit higher log transaction size
Source: thesis Table 6 (probit marginal effects; N = 3,760 cash, 12,175 credit, 11,194 debit preferrers). Year fixed effects and demographics included. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level; all shown estimates significant at p<0.01. Percentage points.
1A convenient favourite is a sticky favourite
Across all three groups, a one-point higher Convenience Advantage is associated with a lower probability of deviating: 4.70 percentage points for cash preferrers, 4.90 for credit preferrers and 4.69 for debit preferrers. The consistency is striking. Whatever instrument a consumer prefers, the more convenient they judge it relative to the alternatives, the more likely they are to keep using it.
2Transaction size cuts both ways
Transaction size behaves asymmetrically. For cash preferrers, a one-unit increase in log transaction size is associated with a 9.1-percentage-point increase in the probability of deviation. For credit and debit preferrers the relationship reverses: deviation probability falls by 8.6 and 4.5 points, respectively. The pattern may be consistent with the physical constraints of cash in larger purchases, and aligns with Greene, Shy and Stavins (2026) on the role of merchant steering and transaction context.
A one-unit change in log size is a large change in the purchase itself — roughly a 2.7-fold increase in the amount — so these estimates describe how deviation differs across small and large purchases, not the effect of adding a few dollars to a bill.
Merchant context
Where a purchase happens is closely tied to how it is paid. Grocery and food account for 28% of in-person transactions each, followed by department stores (15.5%) and gas stations (12.6%). Travel and utilities together account for less than 3%.
Share of in-person transactions by merchant group
Adapted from the original paper
Source: thesis Figure 3. Pooled 2021–2024 analytic sample; grocery is the reference group in the Stage 2 models.
In the deviation models, each merchant effect is measured relative to grocery, the reference group — not as an overall deviation rate at that merchant. With that in mind, the estimates are heterogeneous and often point in opposite directions for different preference groups.
Department store purchases are associated with an 8.0-percentage-point higher probability of deviation for cash preferrers and 6.4 points for debit preferrers, but a 2.8-point lower probability for credit preferrers. Entertainment works the other way: it is associated with 26.7 points higher deviation among credit preferrers and 38.8 points among debit preferrers, but 11.6 points lower among cash preferrers. Services show a similar split (+23.2 and +27.0 points for credit and debit preferrers; −9.7 for cash preferrers). The largest estimates are for the “Other” category, which includes person-to-person payments: +47.5 and +45.2 points for credit and debit preferrers, and −25.9 points for cash preferrers.
Not every merchant estimate is precise. Travel and food are not statistically significant for cash preferrers, and gas stations are not significant for cash or credit preferrers. Merchant group is a consolidation of 21 original categories, so each estimate blends a range of vendors.
Which way preferences break
The last step separates deviation by direction: cash preferrers moving to credit or to debit, and card preferrers moving to cash. This is where the asymmetry becomes most legible.
Directional deviations: which way preferences break
One-unit higher log transaction size
One-point higher Convenience Advantage
Source: thesis Tables 7 and 8 (probit marginal effects; N = 3,629 cash→credit, 3,744 cash→debit, 12,175 credit→cash, 11,194 debit→cash). Significance: cash→credit Convenience Advantage p<0.05; all others p<0.01. Cluster-robust standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Percentage points.
Away from cash. For cash preferrers, larger purchases are associated with a higher probability of switching to credit (+5.67 points per log unit) and to debit (+3.74 points). A higher Convenience Advantage is associated with lower deviation in both directions: −1.72 points toward credit (significant at the 5% level) and −3.04 points toward debit. Among merchants, travel (+15.9 points) and department stores (+6.1 points) are associated with more deviation toward credit, while utilities and “Other” transactions are associated with less deviation toward both cards.
Back to cash. For card preferrers, the size relationship flips. A one-unit larger log amount is associated with an 8.37-point lower probability of switching to cash, for credit and debit preferrers alike. A higher Convenience Advantage again lowers deviation, by 3.24 points for credit preferrers and 3.89 for debit preferrers. The merchant settings associated with card preferrers paying cash are services (+26.8 and +23.5 points), entertainment (+30.2 and +36.6), food (+5.3 and +6.8) and “Other” (+50.3 and +49.5), all relative to grocery.
Card loyalty is strongest at large purchases and weakest in settings where cash still fits the transaction.
These patterns may reflect differences in rewards, fees, acceptance or the physical characteristics of the transaction. The data do not say which. What they do show is that stated preference is not a fixed property of a consumer — it holds more in some contexts than others.
What the findings mean
Taken together, the two stages provide evidence on both the formation of realized payment choice and the persistence of stated payment preferences. Convenience has the largest estimated association with choice among the rated attributes in Stage 1, and Convenience Advantage is consistently associated with preference persistence in Stage 2.
For policymakers and payment companies, the results suggest that new payment methods may need to offer convenience that is competitive with existing instruments in order to encourage use and preference persistence — through payment speed, ease of use, lower effort to carry, and better ways to keep and store payment credentials. Security has a weaker estimated relationship with choice than convenience, suggesting that improvements in security communication alone may have a smaller influence on observed behavior.
Transaction context matters as well. The merchant categories where credit preferrers — the most preference-consistent group — are more likely to pay cash (food, entertainment, services and “Other,” including person-to-person payments) identify settings where consumers are more likely to break from a card preference. These may point to an opportunity for payment options that address both the physical constraints of cash and the costs associated with cards. QR-code payments linked directly to a bank account, for instance, could be an alternative worth testing in those settings.
None of this establishes what would happen if a new method were introduced. It describes which demand-side characteristics are associated with current behavior — a starting point for designing and evaluating such changes, not a forecast of their effect.
Limits and next steps
The data are pooled cross-sections, so the results are suggestive and correlational rather than causal. Quasi-experimental designs would be needed to identify causal determinants of payment choice.
Preferences are recorded once per person, while payments are recorded per transaction, so the analysis cannot see preferences that vary by context. The data also do not record which methods were actually available — in the wallet or at the merchant — at each checkout, which limits the precision of the choice estimates. Attribute ratings may partly reflect habit rather than independent evaluation.
Finally, the conditional logit relies on the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, even though consumers may see credit and debit as closer substitutes for each other than either is to cash. Nested or mixed logit models, panel data, or point-of-sale preference measures would allow future work to relax these assumptions.
Methodology note
A note on interpretation
This feature is adapted from Zhangir Murat’s senior thesis, submitted to Princeton University’s Department of Economics on April 9, 2026, and advised by Juan Camilo Castillo. All figures and estimates come from that thesis, using the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s pooled 2021–2024 SCPC and DCPC. Stage 1 estimates are conditional-logit marginal effects (Table 3, N = 70,659; Table 4, N = 63,046); Stage 2 estimates are probit marginal effects (Tables 6–8). Standard errors are cluster-robust, clustered at the respondent level. Effects are stated in percentage points of probability. The sample is an unweighted, restricted analytic sample drawn from probability-based surveys. All results are associations, not causal effects.
The complete thesis text, all eight tables, the four original figures, equations, the full bibliography and acknowledgements.
Selected sources
Research and data
- 01
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. (2025). Survey and Diary of Consumer Payment Choice [Data set].
- 02
McFadden, D. (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior. In P. Zarembka (Ed.), Frontiers in econometrics (pp. 105–142). Academic Press.
- 03
Koulayev, S., Rysman, M., Schuh, S., & Stavins, J. (2016). Explaining adoption and use of payment instruments by U.S. consumers. The RAND Journal of Economics, 47(2), 293–325.
- 04
Schuh, S., & Stavins, J. (2015). How do speed and security influence consumers’ payment behavior? Current Policy Perspectives, 2015-1. Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- 05
Greene, C., Shy, O., & Stavins, J. (2026). Merchant steering of consumer payment choice (Working Paper No. 26-2). Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- 06
Catalini, C., & Lilley, A. (2021). Why is the United States lagging behind in payments? SSRN.
- 07
Han, P., & Wang, Z. (2026). Technology adoption and leapfrogging: Racing for mobile payments (Working Paper No. 21-05R). Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- 08
Full bibliography (21 entries) in the complete senior thesis.